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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final oidei oi the Utah Laboi Commission This Louii has 
lunsdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann ^ 34A-l-303(6) 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63G-4-
403(1), and 78A-4-103(2)(a) Petitioners have exhausted all administrative remedies 
available at law pursuant to Utah Code Ann £} 63G-4-401 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
ISSUE ONE 
Whether the Administrative I aw Judge abused his discietion b\ tailing to 
refer the issues of medical causation and reasonable and necessary medical care to 
a medical panel as required by rule 
Standard of review The determination of the Labor Commission should 
be set aside as an abuse of discretion if it "exceeds the bounds ot reasonableness 
and rationality " AE Clevite, Inc v Labor Comm'ru 2000 UT App 35, % 7. 996 
P2d 1072 
ISSUE TWO 
Whether the Appeals Board abused its discretion by failing to consider new 
evidence or remand for further proceedings where petitioners made sufficient showing of 
new medical evidence from the deposition of Dr Abolnik that may have altered the 
outcome of the hearing 
Standard of review The determination of the Labor Commission should 
be set aside as an abuse of discretion if it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
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and rationality." AE Clevite. Inc. \ . Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35. < 7. 996 
P.2d 1072. 
ISSUE THREE 
Whether the Administrative Law Judge arbitrarily and capriciously ignored 
competent, material, substantial evidence on the issue of medical causation, or whether 
the findings were supported by substantial evidence. 
Standard of review: "[T]he reviewing court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are 'arbitrary or capricious/ or 'wholly without cause* or contrary 
to the 'one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence* or without "any substantial 
evidence' to support them. Only then should the Commission's findings be displaced." 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981). Substantial evidence is 
"more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence... though 'something less than the weight of the 
evidence'." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comnf n, 776 P.2d 63. 68 
(Utah App. 1989). Substantial evidence is ''such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. The Court reviews the "whole 
record" under a substantial evidence standard. Id. A final order of an Administrative 
Law Judge that is not supported by the record and adequate findings of fact is reversible 
as arbitrary and capricious. Nyrehn v. Indus. Comm'ru 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 
1990). 
ISSUE FOUR 
Whether petitioner's due process and equal protections rights pursuant to 
the Utah and United States Constitutions were violated when the Administrative 
7 
Law Judge admitted the Mecham evidence into evidence and denied petitioner's 
motion to admit the medical report of Dr. Moress into evidence. 
Standard of Review: The application of law b\ the Labor Commission 
should be reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the Labor 
Commission. Whitear v. Labor Comm'm 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App 1998). 
Due process challenges are questions of law that are reviewed by applying a 
correction of error standard. Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comnfn, 2001 UT 
App 370, Tj 17, 38 P.3d 969. Equal protection challenges are reviewed using a 
deferential standard unless a fundamental right is infringed or creates suspect 
classifications. Merrill v. Labor Common, 2007 UT App. 214, If 10, 163 P3d 741 
(reversed on other grounds). 
8 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF STATUTES, RULES, OR 
CONSTITUTIONS 
ISSUE ONE 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i)-(iv); 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601;and 
Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-2(A)(l), (5). 
ISSUE TWO 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i); 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(l)(a)-(b); and 
Utah R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1), (6). 
ISSUE THREE 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(g), (h)(iv). 
ISSUE FOUR 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV; 
Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7, 24; and 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(a), (d). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent filed an Application lor Hcanng with the I abor Commission on 
March 9, 2006, amended on luly 25, 2006, endorsing the Iollowmg issues lor hearing lor 
an injury allegedly occurring on August 19 2002 medical expenses, recommended 
medical care, temporal") total disability, permanent paitial disability permanent total 
disability, and travel expenses This matter went to hearing before The Honorable ludge 
Richard M La Teunesse (hereinafter "ALT *) on Septembei 5 2006 The issues of 
permanent partial and permanent total disability were dismissed on motion of the 
petitioner The ALT issued his final Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law andOidei on 
December 11, 2006 The ALT found that the patient Ms Ga>ehn Mecham contiacted 
meningitis while undei the care of respondent, Tara Bishop at Timpenogas Hospital and 
vomited on respondent on August 19, 2002 The ALT further found and concluded that 
the medical evidence 'without any serious challenge' established that the incident on 
August 19, 2002 caused respondent to suffer meningitis, hypoxic brain injury, 
posttraumatic stress disorder, depression disorder, anxiety disorder chronic back pain, 
and tinnitus The ALT issued an Amended Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Tanuary 3, 2007 
Petitioners filed a timely appeal to the Appeals Board on February 5, 2007, 
arguing that the findings were not based on substantial evidence, that the ALT was 
required to send the medical issues of medical causation and reasonable and necessary 
10 
medical care to a medical panel, and that the ALJ violated petitioners* due process and 
equal protections rights, amongst other issues. 
Petitioners filed a Motion to Reopen or Remand to the Appeals Board on August 
5, 2008, arguing that the Dr. Abolnik deposition testimony was new evidence that should 
be considered by the Appeals Board, or remanded for further proceedings before the ALJ. 
The Appeals Board issued its Order on January 22, 2010. The Appeals Board 
found that there was sufficient non-hearsay evidence other than the Mecham records to 
support a finding that respondent had meningitis. The Appeals Board also denied 
petitioners* arguments that the issues of medical causation and reasonable and necessary 
medical care should have been referred to a medical panel. The Appeals Board found 
that compensability was at issue, not reasonable and necessary medical care or medical 
causation. The Appeals Board also denied petitioners' motion to reopen based on Dr. 
Abolnik's deposition testimony. The Appeals Board concluded that Dr. Abolnik 
"speculated" that respondent had Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever and was "ambiguous 
and equivocal" and "too insubstantial" to warrant reopening the case. The Appeals Board 
also stated that the motion was "unreasonably late" after the appeals deadline, despite the 
fact that Dr. Abolnik's deposition did not take place until May 27, 2008, well after the 
hearing, which was the entire point of moving to introduce new evidence. The Appeals 
Board did not address petitioners' constitutional arguments. 
Petitioners timely filed a Petition for Review to the Utah Court of Appeals on 
February 9, 2010, for review of the entire Order of the Commission. 
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
While working as a post-paitum nurse at Timpenogos Hospital on August 19 
2002, respondent Tara Bishop (petitioner below before the Labor Commission) interacted 
with a patient (Gayelin Mecham) in the labor delivery unit Ms Mecham became ill and 
the respondent tended to her While caring for Ms Mecham. she vomited on the 
respondents exposed arm The respondent washed the vomit off her exposed arm and 
returned to work The respondent returned to work two days later and was informed that 
the patient had been placed in ICU for meningitis She was further instructed to report to 
the emergency room if she experienced meningitis related s\mptoms 
The respondent reported to the ER on August 25. 2002 with complaints of 
headache, nausea, generalized back aches and fever The ER physician noted ' a little bit 
of stiffness and difficulty moving her neck She did have full range of motion * A 
spinal tap tested negative for meningitis and the respondent was discharged with a 
prescription for a Z-Pak, Lortab and Phenergan According to the emergency room 
report, "I do not feel she has meningitis She likely has streptococcal pharyngitis or 
viral syndrome 
The respondent returned to the emergency room approximately four days later 
with complaints of a severe headache and stiff neck She was admitted to the ICU floor, 
put on isolation precautions and administered a morphine drip Respondent briefly 
underwent respiratory arrest as a result of the morphine drip and had to be revived A 
second spinal tap was performed along with numerous viral tests All results eventually 
tested negative for meningitis An MRI was ordered and tested negative for meningeal 
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enhancement. Respondent was prescribed doxycyline. percocet and ibuproten and 
released from care. 
Respondent subsequently began treating with Dr. Berry. On December 31. 2002. 
Dr. Berry diagnosed claimant with a "hypoxic brain injury.** Over the following two 
years, respondent was diagnosed with having sustained: chronic back pain, probable viral 
meningeoncephalitis, post neuropathy pain, mood disorder, cognitive deficits, anxiety, 
depression and post traumatic stress disorder. On August 2, 2006. Dr. Berry opined. 
"...It is my professional opinion that Tara Bishop was correctly diagnosed with 
meningitis.... I conclude that a diagnosis of Aseptic Meningitis is the most appropriate 
form of Meningitis that this patient manifested.'* 
Respondent was treated by Dr. Igor Abolnik, a registered infectious disease 
physician, at Timpenogos Hospital on or about August 30, 2002. Dr. Abolnik prepared a 
report of his findings on August 31, 2002, concluding that respondent had menigmus 
only - not meningitis. Dr. Abolnik noted in his medical report on August 31, 2002, that 
respondent reported attending an outside barbecue in Logan for several hours prior to the 
alleged industrial incident. Dr. Abolnik was deposed on May 27, 2008, in the course of a 
third party action pending before the Utah Third District Court. According to the medical 
testimony of Dr. Abolnik, the symptoms of meningitis are also consistent with Rocky 
Mountain Spotted Fever and Lyme disease. Dr. Abolnik apparently was under the 
impression that the test results returned negative for both Lyme and Rocky Mountain 
Spotted Fever. After reviewing these test results in the course of the deposition, Dr. 
Abolnik concluded that the test returned positive for Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. Dr. 
13 
Abolnik testified that Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever could explain all of petitioner's 
symptoms. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The Commission committed reversible error when the issues of medical causation 
and reasonable and necessary medical care were not referred to a medical panel. 
II. The Commission abused its discretion when it failed to reopen the case based on 
new medical evidence. 
III. The Commission's findings of fact are arbitrary and capricious and not based on 
substantial evidence. 
IV. Petitioners' due process and equal protection rights were violated and the 
Commission abused its discretion by admitting the Mecham evidence and failing 
to admit the Moress medical records. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE COMMISSION COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN THE 
ISSUES OF MEDICAL CAUSATION AND REASONABLE AND 
NECESSARY MEDICAL CARE WERE NOT REFERRED TO A 
MEDICAL PANEL. 
The Utah Labor Commission, through the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter 
"ALT') and Appeals Board, erred by failing to refer the medical aspects of this case to a 
medical panel as required by the Commission's own rules. In order to meet her burden of 
proving a compensable workplace injury, respondent Tara Bishop (hereinafter *'Ms. 
Bishop'') was required to prove that her injuries arose out of and in the course of 
employment with petitioner Timpenogos Hospital. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401. In 
order to prove compensability, Ms. Bishop was required to prove both legal and medical 
causation. Allen v. Indus. Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). To prove medical 
causation, Ms. Bishop was required to show, by a preponderance of competent medical 
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evidence, that the stress, strain, or exertion required by her occupation led to the resulting 
injury or disability. Id. at 27. Furthermore, Ms. Bishop is required to prove. b\ a 
preponderance of competent medical evidence, that the claimed medical treatment, both 
past and future, is reasonable and necessary to treat the compensable workplace injuries. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-417. 
The Utah Labor Commission is required to refer certain medical issues to an 
impartial medical panel for adjudication. The ALJ has discretion to send any medical 
dispute to a medical panel. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601. However, it is mandatory to 
refer certain enumerated medical disputes to a medical panel. Utah Admin. R. 602-2-2. 
One of these mandatory issues is where there is a conflict of medical evidence on the 
issue of medical causation. Id. at A.l. The Order of the Commission should be reversed 
and this case remanded for a medical panel because there was sufficient medical dispute 
on medical causation below and the Commission failed to refer this dispute to a medical 
panel. 
A. The Commission's finding that there was no dispute on medical causation is 
not based on substantial evidence. 
The Commission found there was no conflict in medical opinion sufficient to refer 
the medical aspects of this case to a medical panel. This finding is not based on 
substantial evidence. The issue of whether there is a dispute involving conflicts of 
medical opinions on the medical evidence is a question of fact reviewed based on the 
substantial evidence standard. See Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Indus. Comm'n, 947 
P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). A finding of fact of the Commission must be reversed if not 
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based on substantial evidence. See Drake v. Indus. Comm'n. 939 P.2d 177 
(Utah 1997). 
A party challenging the Commission's findings of fact is required to marshall the 
evidence tending to support the findings of the Commission. Kennecott Corp. v. State 
Tax ComrrTn, 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993). In this case, the following facts tend to 
support the finding of the Commission that there is no dispute of medical opinion on 
medical causation: 
toCOn August 19, 2002 while working as a nurse at Timpanogos, Ms. 
Bishop was assigned to care for Ms. Mecham. Ms. Macham developed a 
headache, shaking, fever and nausea, and accidentally vomited on Ms. 
Bishop's exposed arm. A few days later, Timpanogos informed Ms. Bishop 
that Ms. Mecham had meningitis and that Ms. Bishop should notify her 
supervisor if she experienced any symptoms. 
On August 24, 2002, Ms. Bishop developed a headache and other 
symptoms. On August 25, 2002, her supervisor instructed her to report to 
the Timpanogos emergency room because her symptoms matched those of 
Ms. Mecham. At the emergency room Ms. Bishop underwent a spinal tap 
and other tests of meningitis. Over the next several days, Ms. Bishop's 
symptoms worsened and she returned to Timpanogos's emergency room on 
August 29, 2002. She was admitted into the hospital's intensive care unit 
and underwent another spinal tap. She then received morphine, became 
over-sedated, and stopped breathing for a time. 
MsrBishop was subsequently released from the hospital. . . . After 
her ordeal, Ms. Bishop was left with chronic backache from the spinal taps 
she had received in the hospital. She also suffered a hypoxic brain injury, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and tinnitus." Order Affirming 
ALJ'S Decision, _Appeals Board Utah Labor Commission, January 22. 
2010. 
Petitioners contend that the above facts are contradicted by evidence that a 
reasonable person would find sufficient for a finding that there was, in fact, a conflict in 
medical opinion. Ms. Bishop was admitted to Timpanogos Hospital on August 25, 2002 
and discharged on September 1, 2002. Ms. Bishop presented with stiff neck, headache 
17 
and pain after exposure to a patient at work with meningitis. Dr. Berry, Ms. Bishop's 
priman care physician, referred her to Timpanogos for care. Dr. Rowley, the ER 
physician on August 25, 2002, opined that Ms. Bishop did not have meningitis but 
probably had streptococcal pharyngitis or viral syndrome. Dr. Berry indicated in his 
August 29, 2002 report (referring to Ms. Bishop's children) that "I have elected at this 
time not to treat them as she has ruled out once already for meningitis" (emphasis 
added). Dr. Platte and Dr. Rowley at Timpanogos were the treating ER doctors, along 
with Dr. Igor Abolnik, infectious disease physician. 
On or about August 30, 2002, Dr. Abolnik wrote there was "no clear evidence of 
meningitis. I see meningismus most only in muscle pain on the back. A viral infection 
possibly transmitted through the vomitus of that patient is a possibility" (emphasis 
added). Dr. Abolnik ordered bacterial, viral, lumbar puncture, and brain MRI tests for 
meningitis. Dr. Abolnik wrote that if "MRI and laboratory studies are okay tomorrow 
morning she could be discharged tomorrow." Dr. Platte noted on September L 2002 in 
his discharge summary that "Dr. Abolnik was consulted and ordered numerous viral labs 
and serologies which were pending at the time of discharge. He did place her on 
doxycycline and took her off isolation precautions after his visit with her and after 
reviewing the labs. MRI was also ordered and was negative for meningeal enhancement, 
and was read as normal." Dr. Platte's discharge diagnosis was "Possible exposure to 
patient with meningitis, but no lab confirmation at the time of discharge.'* These records 
indicate that Dr. Abolnik, after reviewing the lab and MRI results he ordered, complied 
with his previous plan and discharged Ms. Bishop with no evidence of meningitis. Dr. 
18 
Berry indicated in the admission record that Ms. Bishop had been ruled out for meningitis 
"once already." Dr. Abolnik. Dr. Berry. Dr. Rowley and Dr. Platte's actions indicate, and 
their reports state, that Tara Bishop did not have meningitis. Furthermore. Ms. Bishop's 
MRI results, blood work and spinal tap did not indicate that she had meningitis. 
These medical opinions are supported by Dr. Jeff Chung's report on March 25, 
2003. Dr. Chung stated that viral meningitis "cannot be absolutely proved or disproved 
based upon objective medical data. What is certain is that Ms. Bishop did not have 
bacterial meningitis/' Dr. Chung, therefore, opined that Ms. Bishop did not have 
bacterial meningitis, and that it was not possible to say within a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty that she contracted viral meningitis, either. 
The above evidence is disputed by the medical opinion of Dr. Berry, who opined 
on August 2, 2006 (almost four years after the date of the injury) that Ms. Bishop had 
viral syndrome or aseptic meningitis as the most likely diagnosis. There is a medical 
dispute, therefore, between Dr. Berry and Dr. Chung, Dr. Platte, Dr. Rowley and Dr. 
Abolnik, as well as the laboratory and MRI results in the medical records exhibit that 
show negative results for any viral or bacterial infection. This dispute over whether Ms. 
Bishop did or did not contract meningitis at work raises a substantial question of medical 
causation. The Commission's finding that the evidence on medical causation was "not 
. seriously controverted" is not based on substantial evidence and should be reversed and 
remanded to the Commission for referral to a medical panel. 
This issue has been properly preserved for appeal by Mr. Kanell, counsel for 
petitioner, at hearing, and in petitioner's motion for review to the Appeals Board. 
19 
Transcript from September 5, 2006 Hearing, ALJ Richard M. La Jeunesse at 106: 20-24. 
Petitioners have argued before the Commission at all stages of administrative 
proceedings in this matter that there was a medical dispute on causation requiring referral 
to a medical panel. See Respondents' Motion for Review filed on February 2. 2007. 
B. The Commission committed reversible error by failing to refer the medical 
dispute to a medical panel. 
The Commission committed reversible error by failing to refer the issue of 
medical causation to a medical panel. The Commission's rules make it mandator}' to 
refer medical causation to a medical panel where there is a conflict in medical evidence 
on this issue. Utah Admin. R. 602-2-2. The Commission's failure to properly apply its 
own agency-specific rules is a question of law. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(a),(d); 
Morton Int'L Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991). The application 
of law to fact is reviewed for correctness. Utah Code Ann. 63G-4-403(4)(d); Drake v. 
Indus. Common, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
^The ALJ below found that the events of August 19, 2002 caused Ms. Bishop to 
suffer: (1) meningitis; (2) hypoxic brain injury; (3) posttraumatic stress disorder; (4) 
depression disorder; (5) anxiety disorder; (6) chronic back pain, and (7) tinnitus. 
Similarly, the Appeals Board determined that Ms. Bishop suffered from the above-
mentioned diagnoses. However, there was a substantial dispute on the issue of medical 
causation, Ms. Bishop's medical records reveals conflicting medical opinions. The ALJ 
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was required to submit a conflict of medical evidence on medical causation to a medical 
panel. His failure to do so is an abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious. 
Petitioners affirmatively pled these defenses in their Answer, listed these defenses 
in their pretrial disclosures, and affirmatively argued these defenses at hearing and on 
appeal. This issue was, therefore, presented and preserved at the agency below and all 
administrative remedies have been exhausted. 
Therefore, there was a substantial dispute between Dr. Platte, Dr. Abolnik, Dr. 
Berry, Dr. Chung on the issue of medical causation. This dispute was required, as a 
matter of law, to be referred to an impartial medical panel to determine whether Ms. 
Bishop contracted meningitis arising out of her work with petitioners. In the 
Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's Decision it acknowledges that a conflict of medical 
evidence exists: 'The results of her tests for meningitis were somewhat ambiguous, 
resulting in equivocal diagnoses by some medical experts. However, other medical 
experts were unequivocal in their opinion that Ms. Bishop did, in fact, suffer from some 
variation of meningitis/' IcL_ at 2. By the Commission's own admission in its Order this 
issue should have been referred to a medical panel. The Court held in Willardson v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 904 P.2d 671 (Utah 1995) where medical causation was at issue that the 
Commission violated its own rule and abused its discretion when they did not convene a 
medical panel for medical causation. Id. Accordingly, the Commission failed to refer this 
dispute to a medical panel, abusing its discretion. Petitioners respectfully request that 
this case be remanded to the Commission for the medical aspects of this case to be 
referred to a medical panel and such further proceedings as necessary. 
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The determination of the Commission should be set aside as an abuse of disci etion 
because their Order exceeds the bounds of reasonableness because the AI I should ha\e 
refened the issues ot medical causation and reasonable and necessary medical care to a 
medical panel as required by Utah Admin R 602-2-2 See AE Clevite, Inc v Laboi 
Comnfn 2008 UT App 35, ^  7, 996 P 2d 1072 
II THE COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO 
REOPEN THE CASE BASED ON NEW MEDICAL EVIDENCE. 
The Commission abused its discretion when the Appeals Board failed to reopen 
the case and either remand to the ALT for further findings, or to make its own findings 
and amend the ALT's order as appropriate Utah Code Ann ^§ 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i) 34A-
2-420(1 )(a)-(b), Utah R Civ P 60(b)(l),(6). See Burgess v Siaperas Sand & Gra\ el 965 
P 2d 583 (Utah App 1998) Petitioners filed a Motion to Reopen with the Appeals Board, 
which had jurisdiction over this matter on appeal at the time, based on new evidence 
obtained from Dr Abolnik's deposition m the civil matter This Court has jurisdiction 
over this issue because petitioners' have exhausted their remedies Fnto-Layv Labor 
Comm'n, 2009 UT 71, 222 P 3d 55 
The petitioners filed a Motion to Reopen due to new evidence Dr Abolnik. a 
registered infectious disease physician, treated the respondent at the hospital on or about 
August 30, 2002 Dr Abolnik was deposed on May 27, 2008, in the course of another 
action pending before the Utah Third District Court In Dr Abolnik's report on August 
31, 2002, he noted that Ms Bishop attended an outside barbecue in Logan for several 
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hours prior to the alleged industrial incident. During Dr. Abolnik's deposition he was 
informed of Ms. Bishop's tests results. Dr. Abolnik concluded at the deposition on Ma\ 
27. 2008 that the tests results from Ms. Bishop's stay at the hospital on or about August 
30, 2002 returned positive for Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. 
The proffered evidence to reopen a claim must not be merely cumulative in nature 
but must disclose new and different facts specifically relating to a disputed issue that 
may compel a contrary result. Southland Corp. v. Indus. ComrrTn, 458 P.2d 630, 632 
(Utah 1969). The Commission abused its discretion in not reopening the claim due to 
new evidence that directly concerns the disputed issues of medical causation that may be 
determinative of the Workers* Compensation claim. 
The proffered evidence of Dr. Abolnik's deposition stating that the respondent did 
not have meningitis but had Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever would have provided the 
petitioners' with a meritorious defense on medical causation and this matter should be 
remanded to the Commission to reopen this case. Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75 j^ 29. 11 
P.3d277. 
The Commission's Order should be set aside and this matter should be reopened 
because the Commission abused their discretion which exceeded the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality by not reopening this matter due to new evidence that 
directly concerns medical causation. AE Clevite, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 
35, f 7, 996 P.2d 1072. Petitioners respectfully request that this case be remanded to the 
Commission for to reopen this case and be re-heard based on new medical developments 
in Ms. Bishop's alleged injury. 
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Ill THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE ABRITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS AND NOT BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The Commission's findings that Tara Bishop contracted meningitis at work at 
Timpanogos Hospital is arbitrary and capricious and not based on substantial evidence. 
Petitioners challenge the ALTs conclusion and his finding of fact and conclusion of law 
that petitioner contracted meningitis at work. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-403(4)(g). 
(h)(iv). 
The weight of the evidence in this matter establishes that Ms. Bishop did not, in 
fact contract viral or bacterial meningitis from work at Timpanogos Hospital. Ms. 
Bishop was exposed to vomitus from Ms. Mecham, who was diagnosed with bacterial 
meningitis. Ms. Bishop was extensively tested for bacterial meningitis and viral 
meningitis by way of blood tests, spinal fluid tests, viral panels, and brain MRI. Ms. 
Bishop tested negative for bacterial or viral meningitis and had no MRI findings 
consistent with meningitis. Dr. Pratte, the ER doctor at Timpanogos, opined that the Ms. 
Bishop had possible exposure to meningitis but no lab confirmation at this time to 
confirm. Dr. Abolnik, the infectious disease expert, opined in his report that claimant had 
meningisgmus only, that is, meningitis-like symptoms without meningitis, but also 
concluded Ms. Bishop could have viral meningitis. Dr. Chung concluded also that Ms. 
Bishop did not have bacterial meningitis. Ms. Mecham was diagnosed with bacterial 
meningitis, not viral meningitis, so it is beyond improbable that Ms. Bishop could have 
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contracted viral meningitis from someone infected with bacterial meningitis. Greater 
than the weight of the evidence shows that Ms. Bishop did not have meningitis. 
"
fc[T|he reviewing court's inquiry is wither the Commission's findings are 
"arbitrary or capricious/ or "wholly without cause' or contrary to the "one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence' or without 'any substantial evidence' to support them. 
Only then should the Commission's findings be displaced/' Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981). Substantial evidence is ""more than a mere 
"scintilla' of evidence . . . though "something less than the weight of the evidence.''* 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 
1989). Substantial evidence is "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.'' IcL_ The Court reviews the ""whole record" under a 
substantial evidence standard, Id. A final order of an ALJ that is not supported by the 
record and adequate findings of fact is reversible as arbitrary and capricious. Nyrehn v. 
Indus. Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 1990). The ALJ acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner by ignoring this contrary evidence and his findings are not supported 
by substantial evidence. The ALJ's findings are founded on the opinion of Dr. Berry, 
who opined that Ms. Bishop had aseptic meningitis, and the suppositions of Dr. Chung 
and Dr. Abolnik that Ms. Bishop may have contracted viral meningitis. This evidence 
only rises to a "scintilla" of evidence in comparison to the weight of the laboratory, MRI, 
and other evidence, including the opinion of the ER doctor that Ms. Bishop did not have 
meningitis. Petitioners respectfully request that the findings of the ALJ below be found 
to be without substantial evidence and the Order of the Commission below be reversed. 
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IV PETITIONERS' DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS 
WERE VIOLATED AND THE COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY ADMITTING THE MECHAM EVIDENCE AND FAILING TO ADMIT 
THE MORESS MEDICAL RECORDS. 
Petitioners' due process and equal protection rights were violated b\ the ALJ not 
being impartial at the hearing and admitting Ms. Mechairf s records and failed to admit 
Dr. Moress' report. U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7, 24, See Bundell \ . 
Indus. Comm'n 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987). 
The ALJ allowed the Respondent to utilize undisclosed records, but kept out the 
medical opinion of Dr. Moress, despite the fact that Respondent had agreed to see him. 
was notified that Petitioners would be utilizing his report, and was given a copy of the 
report prior to the hearing. Petitioners have been treated differently in violation of their 
equal protection rights. 
Equal protection claims under the Equal Protection clause of the United States 
Constitution are the uniform operation of laws provisions of the Utah Constitution are 
substantially paralle. See State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, U 31-35, 1*4 p-3d 585. see also. 
U.S. Const, amend XIV, § 1 (c'No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Utah Const, art. I, § 24 (%CA11 laws of a 
general nature shall have uniform operation." Anderson v. Provo City, 2005 UT 5, c c 17-
18, 108 P.3d 701 (stating that the two provisions embody the same general principles, 
although under some circumstances, Utah's uniform operation of laws provision is more 
rigorous than the federal equal protection clause). 
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Under each, a reviewing bod\ must determine what classifications are created b\ 
the statute, whether they are treated disparately. and whether the disparate treatment 
serves a reasonable government objective. State v. Schofiled. 2002 UT 34. T31. 114 P.3d 
585. 
In this case, Respondent was given differential treatment as to presenting 
undisclosed and unidentified evidence (Mecham medical records) at the trial despite 
Petitioners' objections. Petitioners were denied the opportunity to present their Dr. 
Moress report, despite having disclosed said report prior to trial and despite Respondent's 
knowledge Petitioners' intent to utilize the report at the hearing. This disparate treatment 
of similarly situated parties violated Petitioners' equal protection rights. 
At the September 5, 2006 hearing the ALJ admitted into evidence Ms. Mecham's 
medical records, but failed to allow the petitioners to admit into evidence Dr. Moress' 
medical records review. Before the hearing, the respondent was scheduled to attend an 
IME with Dr. Moress. Transcript from September 5, 2006 Hearing, ALJ Richard M. La 
Jeunesse at 8:24-25. However. Dr. Moress was in an automobile accident and was unable 
to perform the evaluation before the hearing. Id. at 9:4-6. The petitioners' counsel 
requested a continuance so that Dr. Moress could perform his IME on the respondent; 
however, the ALJ denied a continuance. Id. at 14:14-17. Dr. Moress did a medical 
records review because he was unable to physically examine the respondent. Id. at 11:10-
14. Unfortunately, petitioners* counsel did not receive that report until a few days before 
the hearing and sent a copy of it to respondent's counsel a few days before the hearing. 
The ALJ did not admit Dr. Moress' report into evidence because he stated it was 
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untimely and the respondent had other IME's done. Id. at 11:23-25. 12:1-5. However, the 
respondent's IME's were performed substantial]} earlier. Moreover, they were performed 
by her own treating physicians. Id. at R 12:12-18. Furthermore, if the ALJ allowed Dr. 
Moress' report into evidence this was have created additional conflicts in medical 
opinions and would have been referred to a medical panel. 
On the other hand, the ALJ allowed the respondent to admit into evidence medical 
records from Ms. Mecham. Id. at 58:22-25, 59:1-3. These records where not provided in 
their entirety to petitioners' counsel before the hearing and greatly prejudiced the 
petitioners. Id. at 58:1-13. By the ALJ admitting into evidence Ms. Mecham"s medical 
records and failing to admit Dr. Moress' report violated the petitioner's due process and 
equal protection rights. 
Every person who brings a claim or defends a claim at a hearing held before an 
administrative agency has a due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair 
tribunal. Anderson v. Indus. Comm'n, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985). The ALJ was biased 
towards the petitioners by allowing evidence from the respondent presented untimely but 
denying crucial evidence from the petitioners' that was untimely. The ALJ based his 
opinion on medical causation by the Mecham records and not allowing the petitioners' to 
rebut the evidence by Dr. Moress' report or having a fair amount of time to review the 
records violated the petitioners' right to due process and equal protection of the laws. 
The application of law by the Commission should be reviewed for correctness, 
with no deference given to the Commission. Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 
984 (Utah App. 1998). Due process challenges are questions of law that are reviewed by 
28 
applying a correction of error standard. Color Countn Mgml. Labor Comm'n. 2001 UT 
App 370. ^ 17, 38 P.3d 969. Equal protection challenges are reviewed using a deferential 
standard unless a fundamental right is infringed or creates suspect classifications. Merrill 
v. Labor Comm^n, 2007 UT App 214.1j 10, 163 P.3d 741 (reversed on other grounds). 
Petitioners' respectfully request that the findings of the ALJ below be found to be biased 
towards the petitioners' thereby violating the petitioners' right to due process and equal 
protection and the Order of the Commission below be reversed. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully request that this Court reverse the final 
order of the Labor Commission, below as an abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious, 
and not supported by substantial evidence, and remand for such other proceedings as 
necessary. 
DATED this ^ 
T * 
day of July, 2010. 
THOMASJ&0LLART & MILLER LLC 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Timp/nogos Regional Hospital and/or Zurich 
Insu/ance 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Reproduction of opinion, memorandum decision, findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, orders, jury instructions. 
None. 
B. Reproduction of parts of the record of central importance such as 
contracts or other documents. 
None. 
C. Reproduction of determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i)-(iv): 'The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: the agency action is: (i) 
an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; (ii) contrary to a rule of the 
agency; (iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or (iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601: "(1) (a) The Division of Adjudication may refer 
the medical aspects of a case described in this Subsection (l)(a) to a medical panel 
appointed by an administrative law judge: (i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
arising out of and in the course of employment for: (A) disability by accident; or (B) 
death by accident; and (ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance carrier denies 
liability, (b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medical panel upon the filing of 
a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to an occupational disease. 
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(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more physicians 
specializing in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim, (d) As an 
alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical exaluation of the medical aspects of 
a controverted case, the division may employ a medical director or one or more medical 
consultants: (i) on a full-time or part-time basis; and (ii) for the purpose of: (A) 
evaluating medical evidence; and (B) advising an administrative law judge with respect 
to the administrative law judge's ultimate fact-finding responsibility, (e) If all parties 
agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical consultants, the medical 
director or one or more medical consultants is allowed to function in the same manner 
and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. (2) (a) A medical panel 
medical director, or medical consultant may do the following to the extent the medical 
panel, medical director, or medical consultant determines that it is necessary or desirable: 
(i) conduct a study; (ii) take an x-ray; (iii) perform a test: or (iv) if authorized b> an 
administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem examination, (b) A medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant shall make: (i) a report in writing to the 
administrative law judge in a form prescribed by the Di\ ision of Adjudication; and (ii) 
additional findings as the administrative law judge ma\ require, (c) In an occupational 
disease case, in addition to the requirements of Subsection (2)(b), a medical panel, 
medical director, or medical consultant shall certify to the administrative law judge: (i) 
the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for remuneration 
or profit; (ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the 
medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant results from the occupational 
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disease; and (iii) (A) whether any other cause aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in 
any way contributed to the disability or death: and (B) if another cause contributed to the 
disability or death, the extent in percentage to which the other cause contributed to the 
disability or death, (d) (i) An administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full 
copies of a report submitted to the administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by 
mail to: (A) the applicant; (B) the employer; (C) the employer's insurance carrier: and (D) 
an attorney employed by a person listed in Subsections (2)(d)(i)(A) through (C). (ii) 
Within 20 days after the report described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is deposited in the 
United States post office, the following may file with the administrative law judge a 
written objection to the report: (A) the applicant; (B) the employer; or (C) the employer's 
insurance carrier, (iii) If no written objection is filed within the period described in 
Subsection (2)(d)(ii), the report is considered admitted in evidence, (e) (i) An 
administrative law judge may base the administrative law judge's finding and decision on 
the report of: (A) a medical panel; (B) the medical director; or (C) one or more medical 
consultants, (ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), an administrative law judge is not 
bound by a report described in Subsection (2)(e)(i) if other substantial conflicting 
evidence in the case supports a contrary finding, (f) (i) If a written objection to a report is 
filed under Subsection (2)(d), the administrative law judge may set the case for hearing to 
determine the facts and issues involved, (ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection 
(2)(f), any party may request the administrative law judge to have any of the following 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination: (A) the chair of the 
medical panel; (B) the medical director; or (C) the one or more medical consultants, (iii) 
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For good cause shown, an admimstiative law judge ma) order the following to be present 
at the hearing for examination and cross-examination (A) a member ol a medical panel 
with or without the chair of the medical panel, (B) the medical director, or (C) a 
medical consultant (g) (1) A written report of a medical panel, medical director, or one 01 
more medical consultants may be leceived as an exhibit at a hearing described in 
Subsection (2)(f) (n) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(g)(i). a report received as an 
exhibit under Subsection (2)(g)(i) may not be considered as evidence in the case except 
as far as the report is sustained by the testimony admitted (h) For a claim referred under 
Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant before Tul\ 1 
1997, the commission shall pay out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund established in 
Section 34A-2-702 (I) expenses of a study or report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultant, and (n) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical 
director's, or medical consultant's appearance before an administrative law judge (I) (l) 
For a claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical director, or medical 
consultant on or after Tuly 1, 1997. the commission shall pay out of the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund established in Section 34A-2-704 the expenses of (A) a study or report 
of the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant, and (B) the medical panel's, 
medical director's, or medical consultant's appearance before an administrative law judge 
(n) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in Subsection (2)(i)(i) 
shall be paid from the Uninsured Employers' Fund whether or not the employment 
relationship during which the industrial accident or occupational disease occurred is 
localized in Utah as described in Subsection 34A-2-704(20)." 
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Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-2(A)(l): "Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601. the 
Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining the necessity of 
submitting a case to a medical panel: A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where one or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a 
significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 1. Conflicting medical opinions related to 
causation of the injury or disease 
Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-2(A)(5): "Pursuant to Section 34A-2-60L the 
Commission adopts the following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel: A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge 
where one or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a significant 
medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant medical issues 
are involved when there are: . . . 5. Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more 
than $109000." 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(l)(a)-(b): "(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of 
the commission over each case shall be continuing, (b) After notice and hearing, the 
Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board in accordance with Part 8, 
Adjudication, may from time to time modify or change a former finding or order of the 
commission." 
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Utah RXiv.P. 60(b)(1): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court max 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . ." 
Utah RXiv.P. 60(b)(6): "(b) Mistakes; inadvertence: excusable neglect: newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g): u(4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: . . . (g) the agency 
action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court; . . . ." 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
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Utah Const, art. I, § 7: "No person shall be depmed of life, liberty or propert}. 
without due process of law." 
Utah Const, art. I. § 24: ''All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G4-403(4)(a): "(4) The appellate court shall grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial 
review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: (a) the agency action, 
or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or 
as applied: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G4-403(4)(d): u(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if. on 
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has 
been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: . . . (d) the agency has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law; 
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